Mythbusters: Iguodala the S...

The first chart is simply his half-court shot distribution, separated into Jump shots, Runners in the lane, Drives into the paint, and post-ups. This in terms of the percentage of his half-court field goal attempts (does not include transition attempts):



What do we see here? The obvious numbers that jump out are his first two years. Chris Webber came over during the 2004-2005 season, and Andre Iguodala was largely the 3rd or 4th option on the court offensively. This allowed Iguodala to limit himself to spot-up jump shots, limit his post opportunities to obvious mismatches, and not have to create nearly as much off the dribble. Iverson and Webber were sent packing during the 2006-2007 season, and predictably Iguodala was forced into more jump shots as the burden to create was placed primarily on his shoulders. As such, his last 4 years numbers are most relevant to his current role on the team.

This next image is his effectiveness (eFG%) on those same breakdowns:



Not surprisingly, his effectiveness on jump shots was at his highest when he was taking the least of them. The glass half full guy says that, despite increasing the amount of his half-court shots that are jump shots (up to 72% from 68%), he's shooting his jumpers more efficiently than he has at any point since he's becoming the primary option on the Sixers. The obvious negative number there is his efficiency on drives. Iguodala had been fairly pedestrian in comparison to his peers prior to last year (a career year in that regard), and his efficiency fell sharply below his career norms this year. The top of the line finishers convert at around a 60-62% clip, the good ones in the 56% range. Iguodala's continually in the 52-54% range, which while itself not horrible, is well below expectations considering how comparatively little he's going to the basket. Which brings me to the next table.

This table compares Iguodala to his peers. The first column is their % of half-court attempts that are jump shots, with the second column being their eFG% on those jump shots. The third column is the % of their overall attempts that come in transition, and the last column is their eFG% on half-court attempts:



Compare Iguodala's % of half court shots that are jumpers (I've duplicated this years data down to this graphic to make it easier to compare, scroll back up for Iguodala's historical trends) with some other wing players. You'll notice that Igudoala, consistently shooting 67-75% of his half-court attempts as jump shots, is among the wing players with the highest % of half-court shots that are jumpers. The lower the number, the less they're relying on jumpers in half court set. Igudoala's usage in the half court compares more directly with Ray Allen than he is with players you would largely consider to be slashing wings such as Richard Jefferson and Paul Pierce. Even Joe Johnson, who takes 4.8 three pointers per game, ends up taking a larger percentage of his half-court attempts on drives to the basket. Iguodala's amongst the more jumper-heavy wings in the half court, and while his jump shot percentage is at an all-time high (for his current role on the team), it's still not in the same ballpark as the other jump shooting wing men on the list. In fact, on the list of players who take jump shots on 60% or more of their half court attempts, the only one even close to Iguodala in terms of inefficiency is OJ Mayo.

Despite popular opinion that Iguodala is a slashing wing player, taking jumpers on 70-72% of his half court attempts places him among the more jumper-heavy wings in the league, which is a little troublesome considering his overall lack of efficiency in those situations.

The next graphic is Iguodala's per-year shot distribution, showing the overall trend that was shown in the graphic above (which only included Iguodala's 2009-2010 data to compare to the other wings):



Compare that with the previous chart showing other wing players, and it shows that Igudoala (consistently getting 18-20% of his attempts in transition) relies on the fast break more than virtually any wing listed in this study, with the exception of OJ Mayo and his teammate, Thaddeus Young. He's also generally in the 43% range in terms of eFG% in the half court, which is a good 6%+ below most of the other wings and more than a full 10% less than best. Overall, Iguodala's a fairly inefficient half-court player, and has been since he's taken over as the primary option on the Sixers. Want to know where the majority in his drop in FG% has come from (he went from 47% shooting last year to 42.7% this year)? Transition. Iguodala's always been one of the most efficient players in the league in transition and so far this year he hasn't been able to replicate that level of success. Part of that may be due to the loss of Andre Miller, but I do believe a part of that is likely to recover to his career norms.

The next graphic shows Iguodala's per-year effectiveness on jump shots off the dribble.



Bottom line? Shooting jump shots off the dribble has never been Igudoala's forte, and it doesn't seem to be improving drastically with time. He'll be his most effective as a jump shooter when he's no longer burdened with creating as much as he's asked to now and he can limit himself to spot-up jumpshots.

This next graphic shows his shot distrubition on jump shots from certain locations on the floor, breaking it down to closer than 17' (short), 17' to the 3 pt line (midrange), and 3 pt shots. NOTE this is not his effectiveness on those jump shots, but his distribution. Effectiveness will come later.



More and more of Iguodala's shots have been moving from midrange shots to 3 pt distance.

And now, for the effectiveness of those shots:



His midrange shots are more efficient this year, but on the whole the sample size is small enough it may not be meaningful, as more of his shots have moved to 3 pt distance. The increase in effectiveness on midrange shots is largely offset by the sharp decrease in effectiveness on close jumpshots.

Conclusion:

Iguodala's not a slashing wing player. He's a transition wing player, and when forced into a half-court game turns into primarily a jump shooter, a role he's not particularly efficient at. His best attribute in the half court offensively is still creating for teammates, as he's a great interior passeer.

Gut reaction is to say Eddie Jordan's system is moving Iguodala further from the hoop, but the data doesn't necessarily support that, as he's been primarily a jump shooter in the half court since he's been the Sixers best player.

His jump shooting, by and large, is at about the same level of efficiency as it has been in prior years, with minor year to year variations. This year has been his most efficient, but not by a significant margin.

When he does drive to the hoop he's of average effectiveness, with last year being an abnormally efficient season and this year being abnormally inefficient.

He's greatly a product of diminishing returns, and when he gets a legitimate star to play next to who can create (both for himself and for others) in the half-court, Iguodala can limit his attempts to obvious mismatches and open shots.

His drop in efficiency this year can largely be attributed to 2 things:
- He's taking a higher percentage of his half-court shots as jump shots, which are lower percentage shots than drives to the hoop. That being said, the change is not drastic from his 2007-2008 shot distribution.
- His effectiveness in transition is drastically less than his career norms.

Thoughts?